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Résumé
Le présent article s’attache à démontrer l’incohérence conceptuelle du principe qui sous-
tend l’impérialisme libéral. Selon ce principe, les nations libérales se doivent d’intervenir
chez les nations non libérales en réaction à des violations systématiques des droits de la
personne, afin de créer les conditions permettant à la population de devenir un agent de
contestation. Toutefois, la légitimité d’une intervention de ce type repose sur un
présupposé qui nie en fait ce qui est censé la justifier : la capacité des opprimés à
contester. Ce manque de cohérence amène l’article à esquisser, en conclusion, une
conception matérialiste de l’agent de contestation, où prime la capacité des populations
opprimées à trouver des sources internes de critique et de transformation sociale. 
Abstract
The paper argues that the principle that underlies liberal imperialism is conceptually
incoherent.  The Principle of Liberal Imperialism claims that liberal nations have a duty to
intervene in non-liberal nations in response to persistent human rights violations for the
sake of creating the conditions in which the agency of the population can be realized. The
legitimacy of such interventions, however, is rooted in a presupposition that denies the
very agency of the oppressed in whose name the intervention is justified.  In response to
this incoherence the paper concludes with the outline of a materialist conception of agency
that prioritises the capability of oppressed populations to find internal resources of critique
and social transformation. 
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Introduction
It is ironic, given George W. Bush’s evangelical antipathy towards all things “liberal” that
his attempt to justify the second Iraq war as a battle for human rights and democracy
echoes cosmopolitan liberal arguments in favour of military intervention against
authoritarian regimes.  The cosmopolitan liberal argument of course does not necessarily
favour unilateral military action by the United States, but its commitment to armed
intervention by the community of ‘democratic’nation states betrays an underlying unity of
principle with the rhetorical strategy now being adopted by the American administration.
Michael Ignatieff, for example, defends military intervention to effect regime change as a
‘lesser evil’ (2004: 160-67). David Held (2004), generally a more aggressive critic of
contemporary global relations, posits the need for a reformed United Nation’s security
apparatus that would make it possible to democratically legitimate the invasion of states
found to be in serious and long-term breach of global human rights standards.
In this paper I am interested in teasing out this underlying unity of principle, not as a
reductio ad absurdum of cosmopolitan liberalism, but rather to disclose the conceptual
incoherence of what I will call the Principle of Liberal Imperialism (PLI).  My essential
aim in so doing is to reveal a fundamental contradiction between the principled value of
human freedom in whose name ‘human rights wars’ are purportedly launched and the
denial in practice of the freedom and agency of the citizens of the targeted nation.  Once
the conceptual incoherence of the PLI has been made clear it will become apparent that its
contradictions stem from deeper inadequacies in the liberal conceptualization of human
rights.  I will conclude the argument by laying bare these inadequacies and defending an
alternative materialist interpretation of the foundations of human freedom.  T h i s
alternative shifts the focus from an asserted duty of ‘democratic’nation states to create free
institutions  for oppressed populations to the capacity of those populations to transform
their own societies themselves.
The Principle of Liberal Imperialism
The immediate context for this investigation of the coherence of the PLI is the effort of the
American administration to justify their invasion of Iraq as essential to the interests of the
Iraqi people themselves in securing the social conditions of freedom.  However, the PLI
cannot be understood simply as a rhetorical tactic of particular administrations. It is a
general principle running beneath liberal conceptions of the relationship between Western
liberal-capitalism and the non-Western, non-liberal world.  I will first state the principle
clearly and then reconstruct the presuppositions that must be in place in order for it to take
on the appearance of plausibility.
The collapse of the Stalinist societies of Eastern Europe had the dual effect of discrediting
all forms of socialism as a real alternative to capitalism and establishing the liberal form
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of democracy as the only real form of democracy historically possible.  In short, the new
historical conditions after 1989 made it appear that liberal-capitalist democracy was the
only form of a free society worth fighting for because it was the only form of free society
possible.  These events seemed to reconfirm an older understanding of Western social
organization as the necessary goal of all social development.  On this assumption all other
modes of social organization appear as historically retrograde in a quite precise sense.
Since non-liberal forms of social organization are assumed to rest upon irrational forms of
authority, such that people trapped within in them are kept in place by archaic belief-
structures, it seems to follow that they are incapable of freeing themselves unless rational
liberal ideas are imported into them by the agency of Western powers.
The Principle of Liberal Imperialism (PLI) can be discovered by reflecting upon what ties
together the classical liberal understanding of the nature of non-liberal societies to the
post-1989 form of liberal-capitalist triumphalism.  It can be formally defined as follows:
The commander in chief of a militarily dominant nation or a self-selected collective of
democratic nations is legitimately entitled to order his or her armed forces or a collective
of the armed forces of democratic nations to invade the internationally recognized
sovereign space of another nation when that nation is a known violator of human rights,
even in the case that: 1) there is no authorization in international law for the invasion, 2)
the geo-strategic interests of the militarily dominant nation or collective of nations and its
(their)  historical rivals can be demonstrated to be the structural cause of the history of
human rights violations, and 3) no independent, organized, and recognized body of
citizens in the oppressed nation has called for an invasion as a means of their liberation.
The generality of the principle is obtained by abstraction from the concrete history of the
last two centuries of imperialist conflict.  The first historically significant version of this
principle was the product of British, not American imperialism. Recall, for example, J.S.
Mill’s assertion that Britain was entitled to rule India since India, 2500 hundred years of
complex cultural, artistic, political, mathematical, scientific, and philosophical history
notwithstanding, was in its “nonage” (Mill, 1975: 11).1 Since the structure of Indian
society was assumed to be such that Indians themselves could not understand their own
oppression (that is what he means by ‘nonage’) their only hope was to acquiesce in the
imposition of British forms of government.  Like children unable to understand what is
good for them, Indian people could only assume control of their own affairs once they had
emerged from a period of tutelage.  One can see exactly the same sort of reasoning at work
in Iraq today. American commanders continue to maintain that they cannot withdraw
troops until Iraqis have become politically and militarily mature enough to assume
responsibility for their own affairs.
1 To be fair it should be noted that Marx did not essentially disagree with Mill on this point. (Marx,
1972: 35-41, 81-87).  For a deeper discussion of the ironies produced by this agreement see Noonan
(1997: 1000-1011).
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The conceptual arc that links the classical and contemporary forms of the PLI is thus
established and maintained by a certain presupposition without which the principle does
not make sense.   If, as the principle maintains, liberal societies are duty bound to invade
an oppressive but nevertheless sovereign nation if the invasion is undertaken in the name
of the oppressed people (but without their asking to be invaded), then it must be
presupposed that the oppressed themselves cannot, even in principle, free themselves from
this oppression.  Unless that presupposition is granted there would be no reason for the
invasion.  Since the invasion is undertaken in the name of enforcing the human rights of
the oppressed, it would be wholly unnecessary if, alternatively, it were presupposed that
they could, through their own struggles, overcome the tyranny under which they suffer.
Thus, without the presupposition of the political or historical backwardness and
incompetence on the part of the oppressed, the PLI would make no sense.  In fact, it is so
important to the plausibility of the PLI that it could be called quasi-transcendental to
indicate its constitutive but historically ungrounded function.2 That is, the presupposition
of the political backwardness of the oppressed tends to ignore or rule out evidence to the
contrary and to always suppress the contribution that major imperialist powers have made
to the so-called backwardness from which the oppressed must be rescued.  Again the
current situation in Iraq is a paradigmatic example of the point I am making.  The
demonization of Hussein in the run up to the war suppressed the historical cooperation
between the Reagan administration and Hussein’s brutal regime.  It also ignored the fact
that Hussein was supported in his rise to power, encouraged in his destruction of the
progressive elements of the original Ba’ath movement, its anti-imperialism and its
investment of oil wealth in the development of region-leading social infrastructure, and his
abuses overlooked so long as he was a trusted ally against Iranian regional power (Ali,
2002).
Thus the hegemony of the PLI depends both upon definite historical conditions and a
selective and one-sided understanding of the cultures within which its political
prescriptions are enacted.  The historical conditions upon which it depends occur
whenever there appears to be no alternative goal to social development other than liberal-
capitalism of a Western form.  When Mill was writing in the mid- to late-nineteenth
century the alternative to liberal-capitalism could only appear to be continued stagnation
under archaic and authoritarian cultural forms.  The subsequent emergence of the various
modalities of socialism offered alternatives for social development.  With the collapse of
plausibility of the various socialist alternatives, the conditions in which the PLI first
gained plausibility have returned.  
2 I am using ‘transcendental’ in Kant’s sense.  A transcendental principle was an a priori structure of
consciousness which enabled definite empirical operations.  The principle at issue here is ‘quasi’
transcendental since, while it is a priori and grounds the possibility of empirical judgements in
particular cases, it is not a property of subjective consciousness but a presupposition of a definite
political theory.
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But the appearance of there being no alternative to liberal-capitalism is only one half of
the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the PLI.  It must also be assumed that the
indigenous culture itself contains no immanent resources for progressive self-
transformation. In order to maintain the plausibility of this assumption the popular media
and public intellectuals must construct the culture and history of the target population as
inherently incapable of producing citizens capable of critical self-reflection and conscious
planning.  Thus, to cite the case of Iraq once again, Western citizens are told again and
again that in addition to the historical legacy of Ba’athism Iraq’s democratic
transformation is impeded by its tribal history, by the atavistic irrationality of ethnic ties,
and by the way in which the Ba’ath party historically exploited those divisions.  There is
of course some truth to this argument, but my point is that it is only one side of the truth.
Ba’athism itself was a product of anti-colonial democratic self-organization in the Arab
world in the late 1950s and early 1960s and demonstrated precisely the capacity for
internal self-organization and self-transformation whose denial is the necessary condition
of plausibility for the application of the PLI to Iraq (and perhaps next Syria, the other
major centre of Ba’athism).
This second set of conditions trades upon a four centuries old assumption of what Charles
Mills has called the ‘system’ of white supremacy. This system, Mills argues, is rooted in
deliberate ignorance of the complexities, nuances, and forms of social intelligence internal
to non-white and non-Western cultures (Mills, 2003).  It might be suggested that not all the
targets of the PLI are non-white cultures; a key case being the NATO led air-war against
Serbia in 1999.  While it is indeed true that the PLI is not applied exclusively to the non-
white world, it is also true that when it is applied to white Western cultures they will be
interpreted according to quasi-racist ethnic caricatures that reveal them to be lacking some
essential element of liberal social intelligence.  Thus the Serbs were uniquely accused of
exclusionary and embryonically violent pre-modern ethnic loyalty.  In the period of intense
inter-imperialist rivalry between Britain and Germany, the liberal elements of German
culture and its profound philosophical contributions to the understanding of the nature and
conditions of individuality and freedom were suppressed in order to present Germans as
culturally programmed for conquest and domination.  These examples could be multiplied
but the point should be clear. The hegemony of the PLI depends upon historical conditions
in which there appear to be no historical alternative to liberal capitalism and the cultures
targeted by the PLI must be constructed in the Western political imagination as in principle
incapable of discovering internal resources for self-transformation.     
Whenever these conditions are satisfied the PLI gains hegemony. The weakening of
national sovereignty by the contemporary forces of capitalist globalization further
strengthens its appearance of plausibility. Alongside the opening of borders to direct
foreign investment, globalization has opened human consciousness to the conditions of
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life around the globe.  This opening of consciousness has awakened people to the reality
of human suffering in other parts of the globe.  To liberals this suffering is understood to
result from the violation of the human rights of the oppressed population, and the solution
therefore appears to be protection of their human rights.  Since the oppressed culture is
understood to be opposed by its historical nature both to human rights and the capability
to generate internal forces for change the only solution appears to be some form of forcible
intervention.   If the oppressed cannot defend themselves against human rights abuses, and
human rights abuses negate the legitimacy of national sovereignty, then it seems to follow
that a major power that respects human rights is not only justified, but indeed mandated,
to invade for the sake of rescuing the oppressed from their plight.
The Conceptual Incoherence of the PLI
I have argued that the PLI justifies intervention in the case where an authoritarian
government persistently violates the human rights of its citizens.  The justification relies
upon the assumed incapacity on the part of a population of a non-liberal culture to organize
and transform its social relations itself.  Thus, in order to become agents, the PLI assumes,
a liberal power or powers must interpose themselves between the citizens and the ruling
powers, removing the latter to make social space for the agency of the former.  Having set
out the structure, presuppositions, and process by which the PLI gains hegemony, let me
now turn to the task of examining its conceptual coherence.
Ironically, the critique of the PLI must begin from the very idea of agency essential to the
justification of the PLI itself.  In fact, it was one of the liberal tradition’s most penetrating
philosophical minds, Immanuel Kant, that provided the formal basis for my critique.
Writing at a time when it was clear that there was nothing democratic about traditional
European culture, Kant saw right through the aristocratic and theocratic argument that
certain groups of human beings were not yet ‘ripe’ for the freedom that eighteenth century
liberals demanded.  Kant argued:
I cannot admit the expression, used by even intelligent men: A certain people ...
is not yet ripe for freedom; the bondsmen of a landed proprietor are not yet ripe
for freedom; and thus men in general are not yet ripe for freedom of belief.
According to such a presupposition freedom will never arrive; for we cannot yet
ripen to this freedom unless we are already set free– we must be free to use
our faculties purposivelyin freedom [and] we never ripen to freedom except
through our own efforts, which we can make only when we are free (Quoted in
Arendt, 1992:  48).
The essential point that I want to draw out of this passage is Kant’s insistence that
‘ripening’ to freedom can only ever take place through the agency of the people who are
‘ripening.’ What he argues is that ripening towards freedom must be the free act of people
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themselves issuing from an essential and underlying human freedom anchored not in this
or that culture but in the self-reflective and spontaneously creative nature of the species
itself.  To argue that a people must pass from one form of tutelage to another is to in fact
deny in essence that they are capable of  the freedom in whose name the tutelage is
undertaken.   This point must be carefully unpacked.  
The deep point implied by Kant’s argument is that if freedom is essential to ripening
towards freedom, then it follows, however paradoxical it may sound, that the means by
which a group is liberated from oppression is also essential.  In other words, a free people
must free itself from oppression; it cannot become free as the passive object of a foreign
power’s activity. The apparent paradox may be resolved by distinguishing an essential
freedom that attaches to human subjecthood as such, and the freedom that is a function of
institutional forms brought into conformity with this essential freedom.  Kant himself,
however, provides only the formal grounds for the critique of the PLI, not its necessary
content.  The problem is that for Kant freedom is just a moral fact about individual human
beings, grounded in our capacity to govern our bodily desires.  As such, freedom is
opposed to our material nature and can never become the fully realized principle of social
life as a whole (Kant, 1987). While the trajectory of Kant’s philosophy is towards a
conception of human social relations as legitimate only to the extent that they make
possible the fullest realization of human freedom, the historical context in which he
worked made it impossible for him to adequately theorize what those social conditions
were  (Goldmann, 1971).  In particular, Kant was blind to the way in which market
relations (then just beginning to emerge as the dominant force of social organization)
functioned as essential impediments to a fully free society.
Thus we must shift our focus from Kant to Marx to fully grasp what it means to distinguish
between an essential form of human freedom and the social forms in which this freedom
is either realized or denied.  To argue that human beings are essentially free is not only to
argue, as Kant does, that our rational nature is a power that enables us to choose the moral
laws that we will obey.  Deeper, ‘freedom’ means that human beings are essentially
capable of collectively transforming their social life so that its governing principles make
possible the type of individually self-determining existence that Kant theorizes abstractly.
The ‘essence’ in question here is not an immaterial universal form.  It is, on the contrary,
a real potentiality of human beings.  Such an understanding of essential freedom is the
basis of Marx’s philosophical foundations of historical materialism.  Reflecting on the
difference between humanity and other species Marx was led to the essential role of
consciousness in distinguishing humanity.  His conception of consciousness, however, is
directly linked with the active processes by which human beings create and transform
social relations.  As he wrote, “the animal is immediately one with its activity.  It does not
distinguish itself from it …. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of
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his consciousness.  He has conscious life-activity” (Marx, 1975a: 276).  In other words,
human beings do not simply behave or mindlessly enact social and cultural codes.
Humans are capable of thinking about what they do.  This capacity to think about what we
do is the basis of possibility for becoming conscious of a contradiction between how we
are acting now and how we could act more fully and freely in changed social conditions.
Hence the capacity to take social and individual life as the object of consciousness and
critically evaluate it against values that are asserted as principles but not yet
institutionalized is the core of essential human freedom.
The evidence of the reality of this essential freedom is given by the millennia old histories
of resistance to multiple forms of oppression.  As Marcuse once argued in relation to the
idea of an essential freedom, its ‘truth ... is preserved better in human misery and suffering
and the struggles against them than in the forms and concepts of pure thought”(Marcuse,
1968: 73.) What Marcuse means is that we cannot understand what misery and suffering
are, much less comprehend the cause of resistance to it, if we do not judge the situation
from the perspective of a real potential (essence) for free existence. Human misery and
suffering is not simply explicable in terms of gross physical deprivation (although the
world still abounds with examples of it) but must be linked to a deeper capability on the
part of people (whatever their concrete identities) to determine their collective and
individual horizons for themselves.  If there were no real potential for self-determination
what could be the deep ground of the real fights against ‘misery and suffering’ to which
history bears witness?
To elaborate by way of answering this question, if a group is really oppressed then there
must be some real aspect of themselves that is prevented from becoming manifest in their
actual situations.  If different groups can truly to be said to be oppressed (i.e. share a
common identity as oppressed) then, whatever their concrete differences they must also
share a human reality which allows their situation to be judged as identical.  To be sure,
particular differences are part of what is oppressed.  Beneath these particular differences,
however, there must also be presupposed a capacity on the part of the oppressed, whatever
their concrete identity, to transform and redefine the institutional structures in which they
live and to consciously (i.e. intentionally and freely) express themselves as they take
themselves to be in their truth.  This capacity for self-determination is the essential human
freedom to which I referred above.  Unless this universal capacity for self and social
transformation is presupposed, then the very idea of oppression does not make sense.
Consciousness of oppression means consciousness of not being able to make oneself in
reality what one takes oneself to be essentially.  But the ‘essence’ here is not a particular
cultural difference but the universal human capacity for self-making and self-
transformation.  Without a sense of themselves as essentially free, no oppressed group
could ever conceive of the concrete social situation being different, and therefore
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resistance would never arise.  The reality of resistance, therefore, proves the reality of
essential freedom; the multiple forms of resistance and the multiple groups that resist
proves the concrete universality of this freedom that defines human beings as subjects, and
not objects, of their own history. To be made the object of the instrumental designs of a
self-interested class, group, party, etc., is, in the deepest sense, to be oppressed   To
overcome oppression, therefore, is to realize in action the essential freedom that makes the
oppressed human, beneath the particular differences that define them as a specific identity
or by which they define themselves.  
Thus it is a contradiction in terms to refer to a people as being liberated from oppression
by an agency which is not their own.  Essential freedom is identical to subjecthood as
conscious agency.  Hence, the oppressed can only define their reality freely if the work of
liberation from oppression is also their own act.  Otherwise they would be in the
contradictory position of being free as subjects at the same time as they are the object of
an external  power determining for them what their future will be.3 In other words, where
an oppressed people is said to be liberated by the agency of an external power, their reality
is not liberation, but of passing from the service of one external power (the oppressor) to
the service of another (the purported external ‘liberators).  In either case, the oppressed
remain in a position of passivity and servitude. 
Real freedom demands that the oppressed are able to prove to themselves that they are
essentially free through new forms of conscious political activity in which essential
freedom can be experienced in its extrinsic, concrete, and actual form.  The oppressed
must experience themselves as the subjects (agents) of their own liberation. One does not
have to accept Marx’s social philosophy and theory of revolution as a whole to recognize
the truth in his claim that “self-emancipation” is necessary in order that the oppressed
“succeed in ridding themselves of the muck of ages and become fitted to founding society
anew” (Marx, 1975b: 60).  No external power can give the oppressed this concrete
experience of their own freedom because concrete freedom is collective self-activity in the
process of institutional transformation.
This fundamental incoherence of the PLI would not be decisively resolved even in the
unlikely event that stable liberal-democratic institutions can be constructed by the foreign
power. Nor is it obviated if the intervening force is mandated to intervene by an (as yet
non-existent) assembly of democratic nations, as theorized by Held (2004). Whether by
illegal unilateral means or
legal collective means, the essential moment required for successful democratic transitions
is lacking:  the decision on the part of the oppressed population to no longer persist in
oppression and thus to organize themselves to create new social relations.  This claim
raises two important objections that must be answered.
3 For a deeper examination of the metaphysical commitments which this conception of freedom
makes, as well as for a defence against postmodern critiques of ‘essentialism’ and a demonstration of
those critiques’ normative and conceptual incoherence, see Noonan (2003).
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The first is a pragmatic objection which maintains that there are cases where the oppressed
people are simply too weak and the oppressing power too strong for internal democratic
movements to succeed.  While in some rare and contingent cases this claim may be true,
it does not follow that the solution to the essential problem (the structure of oppression
under which the population exists) is for liberal nations to militarily invade and forcibly
restructure that society. The solution to that sort of problem (for example, in Darfur) is to
raise the issue to global public consciousness, make the oppressing power aware that the
world knows what it is doing, and to organize solidarity movements that generate extra-
institutional democratic pressure on the ruling power (as, for example, the global anti-
apartheid movement, largely organized without the support of Western governments, did).
The effects of such extra-institutional movements may be slower, but these effects will
better lay the foundation for a lasting progressive change, precisely because they
strengthen the self-organizing capabilities of the oppressed and ensure that the subsequent
changes are in their social and political interests.
The second objection is philosophical and maintains that even where the process of change
is internal, the ideas according to which the change takes place are essentially Western.  To
return to the historical example of India, a classical liberal might argue that British
imperialism was necessary in so far as it introduced new individualistic values into caste
society and thus was the essential condition for the subsequent emergence of liberal-
democracy in India.  This objection suffers from two problems.  First, it ignores internal
normative resources for social transformation (Sen, 1999).  That is, it rests upon the one-
sided caricature of non-liberal cultures discussed above.  More importantly, however, it
distinguishes between the values of social change and the power by which that change is
brought about.  In cases of democratic internal social transformation, however, this
distinction cannot be maintained.  The value and the process by which the value is realized
coincide.  The reality of the value of self-determination, for example, is precisely that
different groups and peoples employ it in actual struggles for change against external
authorities.  That is, once a movement for self-determination emerges it becomes the
material reality of that value such that it makes no sense to say that a non-Western people
enacts a Western value when it struggles for the conditions of self-determination.  The
movement for self-determination is the value of self-determination.  Thus India, to stick
with that example, did not become a relatively stable liberal-democratic regime because
the British exported parliamentary democracy but rather because the Indians themselves
revolted against the colonial structures imposed upon them.  To be sure, liberal-democratic
ideas and institutions were adopted and tailored to an Indian reality. That fact proves that
those ideas are not essentially ‘Western’ but human ideas whose efficacy is contingent
upon their being taken up, used, and transformed by the indigenous population.  
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In other words, the fact that certain ideas might have emerged ‘first’ in Europe does not
means that they are therefore ‘European’ ideas.  As Franz Fanon argued in this regard, “all
the elements of a solution to the great problems of mankind have existed at one time or
another in European thought.  But the action of European man has not carried out this
mission ... let us reconsider the question of the cerebral reality ... of all mankind, whose
channels must be diversified, and whose message must be rehumanized” (Fanon, 1968:
314). Fanon’s point is that the truth of ideas is not determined by the geography of their
emergence, but their applicability to definite contexts of action.  In other words, whatever
specific institutional form(s) the democratic transformation of an oppressed society may
take, if these institutions are to define a free society, they must be created by the collective
efforts of the oppressed themselves.  The PLI’s conceptual incoherence is thus a function
of its claim that in the case of non-liberal cultures the agency of the oppressed population
can only be realized once a liberal power (or group of powers) has intervened and
established itself as the power by which the agency of the oppressed is created and
activated.
Human Rights and Human Freedom
The conceptual incoherence demonstrated above is a formal contradiction existing at the
heart of the PLI.  This formal contradiction is not its only problem, however.  Its
understanding of the content of a free society is equally problematic.  Defenders of the PLI
equate the institutions of developed liberal-democratic capitalism as the necessary and
sufficient social conditions of human freedom.  To conclude, I want to expose the social
contradiction lying at the heart of the liberal understanding of the institutions of a free
society.
The institutions of liberal-capitalist democracy are not identical to democracy and human
freedom but historically specific institutions whose origin must be explained by reference
to the struggle between the dominant economic class and the subordinate classes, sexes,
races, and sub-groups initially excluded by the modern liberal-capitalist nation-state
(Wood, 1995).  The rights that form the conceptual foundation for the idea of human rights
are the constitutional rights that defined the liberal-democratic capitalist nation-state.  Just
as a one-sided interpretation of the content of non-liberal cultures blocks understanding of
internal resources for social transformation, so too an ahistorical and  one-sided
interpretation of human rights blocks understanding of their limitations as the necessary
and sufficient framework for a positively free human society.  Once we explore their
historical origin and social implications, however, their essential limitations come to light.
Like the national constitutions upon which it is modelled, the United Nations’s Declaration
of Human Rights (UNDHR) places overwhelming emphasis on the traditional liberal civil
and political rights: to private property and security of the person, freedom from arbitrary
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arrest and detention, the right to express one’s beliefs without illegitimate interference and
to participate in the politics.  In short, the UNDHR articulates a global framework of
liberal rights in abstraction from the particularity of national citizenship.  As national
constitutions frame the principles of national political legitimacy so too is the UNDHR the
prototype of a framework of international political legitimacy (i.e. the criteria by which a
nation can be recognized as belonging to Held’s (2004) association of democratic nations).
To be sure, civil and political rights represent a profound advance in the struggle against
arbitrary political power, irrational hierarchies of status, and have thus served to advance
formal equality between citizens.  To the extent that they become the objects of struggle
of indigenous political movements around the world they can be powerful tools in the
struggle against oppression.  But what they cannot do, even when coupled with the
positive social and economics rights, is secure the material conditions for a democratic
society and positive human freedom.
This argument will sound surprising to anyone who assumes an identity between
liberalism and democracy and democracy and capitalism. Nevertheless, I contend that the
form of democracy that has evolved from the liberal idea of rights in fact lacks the
essential foundation of a genuinely democratic society– collective control over
fundamental life-sustaining resources and the means of production of social wealth.
Liberal democracy is not based upon the principle that all institutions in which the life-
horizons of people are determined must be under the control of the people whose lives are
so determined.  On the contrary, it is based upon the principle of limited popular power,
and especially upon the limitation of popular power to the ‘public sphere,’ a sphere that
has traditionally been interpreted as exclusive of the economic system.  In the realty which
we inhabit today, consigning the economic system to the private sphere means allowing
the property rights of multinational corporations, not private individuals, to exercise
unchecked power over the life horizons of the globe’s inhabitants.  The UNDHR does not
contest this usurpation of control over the fundamental conditions of being alive and living
freely, but rather facilitates it.  As Teeple argues, “global corporate rights requires
regionally or globally asserted civil and economic rights, and these rights in turn need to
be guaranteed by nation states” (Teeple, 2004:  31).  Since political rights are assumed to
function only in the extra-economic public sphere, and social and economic rights are
upheld only to the extent that they do not ‘interfere’ with the economy, they cannot in and
of themselves form the basis of a democratic counter-weight to the totalizing drive of
global capitalism to appropriate to itself whatever it is capable of bringing within the orbit
of its property rights. 
To insist upon the contradiction between the liberal value of the separation of political and
economic power and the democratic value of collective control over all life-shaping
institutions is not to be indifferent to the difference between constitutionally limited
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government and political dictatorship.  There are degrees of freedom and liberal
democracies are more free than arbitrary dictatorships.  The key advantage of a liberal
democracy, however, is that they make political organization, and therefore the elaboration
of more deeply democratic demands, easier. ( R u e s c h e m e y e r, Huber Stephens, and
Stephens, 1992).  In short, liberal democracy is nothing more (but also nothing less) than
a plateau in the struggle for the social conditions of human freedom.  However, the
globalisation of capitalist economic dynamics has compromised the national foundations
of liberal democracy and therefore the political efficacy of the rights that defined it.  If that
claim is true, then it follows that the liberal idea of human rights cannot be a sufficient
basis for democratic resistence to globalization.  It further follows that simply to insist on
the enforcement of human rights in abstraction from support for local struggles to either
defend or reclaim natural and social wealth from multinational invasion fails to understand
the material conditions of human freedom that human rights supporters nevertheless claim
to uphold.
A world of democratic societies (i.e. societies in which not simply the abstract political
right to participate but in which the actual determination of social policy by interacting
citizens defines the framework of social reproduction) cannot be immediately realized in
the present because the current institutionalization of liberal-capitalist social morality is an
obstacle to it.  That does not mean that rights are nothing but illusory freedoms.  On the
contrary, it means that rights are partial freedoms and that the system of rights, including
as it does the corporate right to own and control the world’s life sustaining resources,
contradicts the material foundations of human freedoms that make civil and political rights
meaningful.  Especially in so far as the system of human rights presupposes the formal
separation of political and economic power it proves itself, at this point in history,
inadequate to the job of satisfying the material conditions of a fully democratic society.  It
does make possible (in principle) the creation of liberal democracies out of dictatorships,
but the two sides of the complex term ‘liberal-democracy’ are in tension with each other.
As Ellen Wood explains, “capitalism made possible the redefinition of democracy, its
reduction to liberalism.  On the one hand there was a separate political sphere in which
‘extra-economic’– political, juridical, or military– status had no direct implications for
economic power, the power of appropriation, exploitation, and distribution.  On the other
hand, there now existed an economic sphere with its own power relations not dependent
upon juridical or political privilege”(Wood, 1995: 234).  That is, the operation of capitalist
markets, unregulated, semi-regulated, or highly regulated, is necessarily coercive,
determining as they do what will be produced, how it will be produced, how much it will
cost, and therefore, by material implication, how lives will be led within it.  Since no
human rights as instituted in the present directly challenge this zone of economic power,
or, indeed, even systematically explain its existence, they cannot form a sufficient
foundation for democratic struggles against it.  Unless those struggle develop and are
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successful, the future course of global development is towards more intense forms of
servitude to capitalist market dynamics and not more democracy.
Thus the fundamental conflict in the world today is a conflict of freedoms.  On the one
hand there is the freedom of capital, in the form of multinational corporate right, to
appropriate to its own use the totality of what there is to be appropriated.  On the other
hand, there is the freedom of human beings as active, potentially self-determining, but also
needy beings, to collectively determine the structures within which individual life-projects
are formed.  The freedom of capital proceeds through the de-regulation of business
environments and the subordination of local and national institutions of political power to
the interests of multinational corporations all backed  by the armed might of the US
military. As Thomas Friedman said, “the hidden hand of the market will never work
without a hidden fist ... and the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s
technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps” (Quoted in
McNally, 2002: 147). When Bush argues that ‘freedom is on the march’ in Iraq he is not
talking nonsense but rather is referring to the freedom of capital.  The freedom of
humanity, on the other hand, proceeds through locally organized struggles to resist the
appropriation of life-sustaining resources by the corporate right.  Standing in solidarity
with those sorts of indigenous movements for a democratic society is the best support that
people in the West concerned about the inhuman life-conditions of others can provide.
Conclusion: Universal Freedom and Solidarity
Superficial appearances of identity  notwithstanding, my critique of the PLI, the liberal
understanding of the social conditions of freedom, and my emphasis on the need for an
organic articulation between the universal idea of human freedom and  indigenous
practices and cultures is not an affirmation of cultural relativism.  If one insists upon the
link (as I do) between human freedom as a universal value grounded in our social-organic
nature as reflective, active, and self-determining beings, and democracy, then many
traditional practices rooted in asymmetries of power (sexual, generational, status, tribal,
etc.), will prove ultimately incompatible with democratic social relations.  Yet, if the work
of freedom (self-transformation) is to be (as it must) the work of the oppressed themselves,
then they must find their own way through these monumental complexities, just as the
West has done (and continues to do, often very poorly).  If the West, after 200 years of
feminist struggle, for example, has still not resolved the problem of the oppression of
women, why should any reasonable person expect that liberal platitudes will solve the
same problem in cultures most Westerners do not understand?  The point of my argument
is not to lend uncritical support to culturally deep-seated forms of power asymmetry. The
point, rather, is that a coherent understanding of the process of creating a free society
entails respect for and confidence in the capabilities of different cultures to understand and
work out for themselves the means of transforming those asymmetries.  Anything less
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presupposes an essentially racist belief in Western superiority. The deep and enduring
structures of oppression in the West make a mockery of such pretensions.    
Moreover, as I noted earlier, those structural imbalances of power are much more likely to
be exacerbated when a foreign invader presents itself as the agent of liberation.  The good
ideas and practices that democratic struggles in Western history have created will be
demonized along with the armed forces, significantly delaying the hard political work of
creating new democratic institutions.  As the case of Iraq once again proves, armed force
is always met by armed force.  Invariably in such situations the invasion provokes
resistence under the control of secretive armed cells whose survival depends upon being
absolutely ruthless and undemocratic.  While armed resistence to armed imperialist
invasion must be regarded as legitimate by anyone who understands the normative
commitments entailed by the idea of human freedom, its methods delay rather than
promote the types of political organization that are necessary for popular liberation from
oppression.  Resources and energy are taken out of the mobilization of political
intelligence and the collective transformation of institutions.  Factionalism and political
cannibalism are inevitable as is the widespread destruction of civilian life and life-serving
infrastructure.  Attempts to practically implement the PLI therefore undermine the
development of just those political forces which could most efficaciously create new and
free institutions.
Just as this argument is not blind to indigenous asymmetries of power, it is also not
indifferent to the reality of the suffering of non-Western others under quite brutal regimes.
It should be clear that I am not contending that comfortable Westerners should be blind to
real suffering or indifferent to developing international movements in the service of
democracy.  In fact, solidarity is a key entailment of this critique of the PLI.  Solidarity,
however, must be rigorously distinguished from unasked for armed invasion of a sovereign
nation.  The criterion whereby they may be distinguished is clear.  Solidarity is always and
by definition a response to a request by the oppressed to stand with them and assist them
in their struggle.  Those who join in solidarity join a movement under indigenous
leadership.  Armed invasion, by contrast, is unilateral and usurpatious by its very nature,
even if it were legitimated by a reformed UN Security Council or a new assembly of
democratic nations.  Solidarity can take many forms, from boycotting goods as in the
global solidarity movement against apartheid to forming brigades of foreign fighters as in
the case of the Spanish Civil War.  No politically organized popular movement of the
oppressed has ever, in my historical knowledge, requested a full-scale military invasion,
complete with mass-murder bombing and subjection to arbitrary martial rule by the
invading host.  Indigenous supporters of invasions are almost invariably politically
connected to the invader and stand to benefit materially from regime change.
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To conclude, it is clear that the PLI is conceptually incoherent.  The nature of human
freedom itself entails that groups of oppressed humans must organize and liberate
themselves from their own oppression.  Otherwise, the foundations of the experience of
freedom necessary to construct free and democratic institutions (experience of themselves
as the subjects of their own history) would be lacking. If my argument is sound then the
people of the world should view with deep suspicion the idea of a ‘human rights war.’ The
millions of people already killed by Western imperialism’s various ‘civilizing’ missions in
the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and now twenty-first centuries should be proof
enough that human freedom is not a Western export and that it can only be created by
people themselves operating from within the cultural frames that structure their history.
Those cultural frames are not fixed realities but malleable structures which the people who
live within them are capable of opening and transforming.  Where solidarity is called for
it can be given in such a manner as is requested by the oppressed themselves.  But more
than anything the oppressed people outside the Western world would benefit from the
growth of democratic struggles within the West against the corporate interests that drive
policy here and which produce so much suffering everywhere. 
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